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MONTANA WATER RIGHTS - A NEW OPPORTUNITYt
34 MONT. L. REV. 57 (1973)
Albert W. Stone*
Article IX, section 3 of Montana's new constitution provides:
All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or
beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed.' .
Of course, such existing rights would be recognized and confirmed without
this comforting assurance. They would, that is, if existing rights were so
clear and well defined as to be recognizable.
Under Montana's present mix of water laws, individuals bring their
troubles and problems to a court, which then renders a decree stating what
the rights of the parties are - what their rights are, that is, only as between
the parties to any particular lawsuit, not what their rights are with respect
to any and all challengers who may come along and start trouble at a later
date. In the past, the Montana legislature has done very little to assist the
courts; so decrees are neither permanent nor conclusive, and rights are
neither clear nor secure: there can be little assurance as to exactly what is
"hereby recognized and confirmed."
People tend to think that although the law may be slow to act,
nevertheless the law ultimately has an answer - a solution that is final and
conclusive. In the field of water law, this feeling, or impression, has been
induced and confirmed by some writers on water law and by some parts of
court decisions taken out of context. A brief review of some of these causes
of incomprehension may be of aid in understanding the legislative
complacency in this area of law, for a legislature, like people, can evidently
be lulled by a sense of legal security which really does not exist at all.
I. INTIMATIONS OF SIMPLICITY AND CERTAINTY
One writer has characterized Montana water rights as being as"...
fixed and impregnable as the Rock of Gibraltar2 - so firm that the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, in each of their plans to
develop the Missouri Basin, could not interfere with the exercise of these
t Reprinted with permission of the MONTANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, The University of Montana. B.A., University of California, 1943; J.D., Duke
University, 1948.
1. Ratified by the voters on June 6, 1972 and proclaimed by Governor Forrest Anderson on June
30, 1972. The new constitution withstood a challenge on the validity of the vote and proclamation on
August 18, 1972. State ex rel Cashmore v. Anderson, - Mont. -, 500 P. 2d 921 (1972).
2. Patten, Water Rights in Montana, 23 R.M.L. REV. 162, 170 (1950).
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rights:
[Nlo farmer need fear that either plan if adopted will divest him
of any established right he may have to the use of water from
streams tributary to the Missouri River. Those rights arefixed
and immutable, and any use of water will have to avoid
disturbing them, whether there be enough water for the purposes
of a larger scheme or not." 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
As early as 1874 the Montana supreme court characterized a water
right thus: "[Ilt is such a species of realty as to require for its transfer the
same form and solemnity as the conveyance of any other real estate.'
Calling a water right "property" endows it with an aura of sanctity and
definiteness, for who can doubt that a person knows the nature of his own
local property? And from time to time since 1874 the supreme court has
had occasion to refer to water rights as "property" or "real estate. ' 5
In 1885, four years before Montana became a state, the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Montana apparently recognized the need to
make future water rights certain, stable, and publicly recorded. It enacted
a statute providing that anyone desiring to appropriate water "must post a
notice" at the point of intended diversion, and then he "shall file with the
county clerk" a notice of appropriation describing the right to be acquired.6
Twelve years later, in 1897, the Montana supreme court decided Murray v.
Tingley,7 in which the court had high praise for this enactment. The praise
came in the court's comparisons of the confusion and uncertainty sur-
rounding water rights acquired before this enactment with the insecurity
afforded post-1885 appropriators who followed the statute:
Questions of priority, however, as well as of the original capacity,
etc., of ditches, depended chiefly on oral testimony, on the
memory of eyewitnesses, often at fault through lapse of time.
Confusion and insecurity to vested rights resulted. To obviate
this as much as possible, the statute was enacted. It required a
notice of location to be posted at the point of diversion, to apprise
others who contemplated the acquisition of water rights from the
same stream that the locator had taken his initial step to
appropriate water. It required a recorded notice of appropriation,
3. Id. at 171.
4. Barkley v. Tieleke, 2 Mont. 59, 64 (1874).
5. E.g.,Quigleyv. Birdseye, 11 Mont. 439,446,28 P.741 (1892) and Middle Creek Ditch Co.N.
Henry, 15 Mont. 448, 572, 39 P. 838 (1892) use the term "real property." Lensing v. Day & Hansen
Security Co., 67 Mont,. 382,384,215 P. 999 (1923); Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 514, 523,50 P.2d 862
(1936), Brennan w. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 567, 55 P.2d 697 (1936); and Harrerv. Northern Pac. R).
Co., 147 Mont. 130, 134, 410 P.2d 713 (1966) are a few that refer to a water right as "property.'"
6. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 89-810 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 19471.
7. Murray v. Tingley, 20 Mont. 260, 50 P. 723 (1897).
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in order that a record might be supplied, giving the history in
detail of each appropriation, which would inure to the benefit of
their successors in interest, as well as to the appropriator's, and
not leave them dependent upon the mere memory of witnesses
when conflicts should arise.8
Such praise of the presumed requirement for filing claims further strength-
ened public confidence in their "rights" regarding water.
Also in 1885, the legislative assembly provided for water rights
adjudication in a code section entitled: "Rights settled in one action." 9 One
writer on water law viewed the effect of that section this way:
[Ilt is essentially an action to quiet title.... It brings before the
court all of the parties who use or claim the use of water from a
stream and its tributaries; allpersons are required to set up their
claims to the use of water, which are then examined and
adjudicated.' 0 (Emphasis supplied.)
Another writer on Montana water law shared the same view, saying:
The basic method of protection of water rights in Montana is by
adversary proceedings between claimants in an action to deter-
mine the relative rights of all parties in the source of supply in
question." (Emphasis supplied.)
Occasionally, when referring to the nature of a water right adjudica-
tion or to the nature of a decreed right which results from an adjudication,
the supreme court implied certainty and conclusiveness. Thus, in Whit-
comb v. Murphy, the court said: "An action to ascertain, determine and
decree the extent and priority of the right to the use of water partakes of the
nature of an action to quiet title to real estate."'1 2 And in Kramer v. Deer
Lodge Farms Co., the court said:
The final decree of 1892 made in Cause No. 404 is binding and
conclusive between all the parties to the suit and their privies and
successors in interest, as to all matters adjudicated therein and as
to all issues which could have been raised irrespective of whether
the particular matter was in fact litigated.'"
Such statements as those referred to above tend to confirm the widely
8. Id. at 268.
9. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815.
10. Patten, supra, note 2 at 169-170.
11. Heman, Water Rights Under the Law of Montana, 10 MONT. L. REv. 13, 29 (1949).
12. Whitcombv. Murphy, 94 Mont. 562,566,23 P.2d 980 (1933). The same terminology is used
in Lensing v. Day & Hansen Security Co., 67 Mont. 382,383,215 P. 999 (1923) and in Missoula Light
& Water Co. v. Hughes, 106 Mont. 355, 363, 77 P.2d 1041 (1938).
13. Kramer v, Deer Lodge Farms Co,, 116 Mont. 152, 156; 151 P.2d 483 (1944).
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held impression that existing rights are so clear and certain that they can
readily be ascertained and catalogued, or conclusively adjudicated. If such
were the fact there would have been no need for further legislation after the
1885 enactments, and the assumption of such factuality may explain the
legislative inactivity since that date in this area of law.1" But such is not the
fact. And in order to know what the "existing rights" are that are
"recognized and confirmed" in the new constitution, one must be able to
say what such "existing rights" actually were prior to the adoption of the
new constitution.
II. WHY "EXISTING RIGHTS" CANNOT BE READILY "RECOGNIZED
AND CONFIRMED"
A. The Water Right Records Are Nearly Useless
As previously mentioned, the supreme court in Murray v. Tingley
15
had high praise for that 1885 statute which provided that anyone desiring
to appropriate "must post a notice" and then file a notice with the county
clerk.1 6 But the statute was not sufficiently detailed and definite in its"
statement of the effect of noncompliance. It said:
A failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter deprives
the appropriator of the right to the use of water as against a
subsequent claimant who complies therewith, but by complying
with the provisions of this chapter the right to the use of the water
shall relate back to the date of posting the notice.' 7
Should that have the effect of completely depriving a non-complying water
user of all rights to his use of water? Or should its effect only be to regulate
priorities among those who comply and those who do not?
In Murray v. Tingley both of the parties before the court were
noncomplying water users. The issue was: who had priority? The plaintiff's
irrigation works had been commenced is 1888 and completed in 1890,
whereas the defendant's works had been commenced later in 1888 than the
plaintiff's, but the defendant completed his works in 1889 and was thus
earlier than the plaintiff's completion. The court decided in favor of the
defendant because he had completed his works and put the water to a
14. Probably the most significant legislation since 1885 was the enactment of an exclusive
method of appropriating from an adjudicated stream. LAWS OF MONTANA, 1921, Ch.228; R.C.M.
1947, § 89-829, construed in Donich v. Johnson, 77 Mont. 229,250 P. 963 (1926). Neither the statute
nor the supreme court has defined what an adjudicated stream is, so that question remains for litigation
in each case in which it arises. See, Stone, Are There Any Adjudicated Streams in Montana?, i9
MONT. L. REv. 19 (1956).
15. Murray v. Tingley, supra note 7.
16. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-810. See, discussion, supra note 6.
17. R. C. M. 1947, § 89-812.
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beneficial use first. The court held that posting and filing a notice of
appropriation pursuant to the 1885 statute would enable an appropriator to
relate his priority date back to the date of posting the notice. More
importantly, it held that upon completion of his works, an appropriator
who ignored the statutory requirements of posting and filing, would
acquire a water right with a priority date-as of when he completed his
works. So there was no need and little reason to pay any attention at all to
the 1885 statute.
Prior to the decision in Murray v. Tingley, the county records on water
rights were unreliable because the filings Were made before any physical
works had been commenced by those who filed."' Hence, there was no
assurance that any of the filings stated a quantity of water that was even
approximately close to the actual quantity taken. 19 In fact, there was no
assurance that after a notice of appropriation had been filed, any
appropriation at all was actually made. So before Murray v. Tingley there
could be an official record of a water right without there being any water
right; after Murray v. Tingley there could also be a water right without any
official record.
B. Adjudication That "Adjusts" A Prior Right Causes
Uncertainties
Ultimately a record will be made of unrecorded water rights, because
without a record such rights invite litigation. But when the lawsuit comes,
appropriators are not always awarded the amounts that they originally
used.
In Power v. Switzer,2 ° for example, the plaintiffs had appropriated all
of the water in Uncle George's Creek in Deer Lodge County in 1868 in
order to run a water wheel to pump a mining shaft in 1885 to 1887, for
placer mining; and in 1887 or 1888, for coal mining. After terminating
those activities and water uses, the plaintiffs used about four miners' inches
for domestic purposes, and turned the remainder into a meadow to grow
wild hay. The defendant came along later, and in 1895 commenced
diverting fifteen miners' inches, upstream from the plaintiff, thus diminish-
ing the plaintiff's supply. Since the creek only carried twenty inches in a dry
season, the plaintiffs sued to adjudicate the waters and to enjoin the
defendant from so depleting the creek. The result: the plaintiffs were
awarded priority only to the amount that they needed at the time of the
adjudication - four miners' inches - and the defendant was decreed the
18. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-810.
19. See, this criticism expanded in STATE ENGINEER'S OFFICE, WATER RESOURCES SURVEY,
MADISON COUNTY MONTANA 1 (1954).
20. Power v. Switzer, 21 Mont. 523, 55 P. 32 (1898).
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balance of the water to the extent of his needs. The grounds of the decision
were similar to those used in determining the amount of an initial
appropriation: what were the appropriator's needs at that time? But the
plaintiffs' initial appropriation was conceded, so the court spoke in terms of
abandonment:
It has been a mistaken idea in the minds of many, not familiar
with the controlling principles applicable to the use of water in
arid sections, that he who has diverted, or "claimed" and filed a
claim of, water for any number of inches, has thereby acquired a
valid right, good as against all subsequent persons. But, as the
settlement of the country has advanced, the great value of the use
of water has become more and more apparent. Legislation and
judicial exposition have, accordingly, proceeded with increasing
caution to restrict appropriations to spheres of usefulness and
beneficial purposes. As a result, the law, crystallized in statutory
form, is that an appropriation of a right to the use of running
water flowing in the creeks must be for some useful or beneficial
purpose, and when the appropriator, or his successor in interest,
abandons and ceases to use the water for such purpose, the right
ceases.
21
In Gilcrest v. Bowen," the plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin defendant
from interfering with their use of water from Antelope Creek in Judith
Basin County. Although the plaintiffs established an 1883 right to 160
miners' inches, the trial court found that the defendant had an earlier 1882
right to 172 miners' inches. Yet, on appeal, the Montana supreme court
decreed to defendant an 1882 right to only 80 miners' inches. The
defendant's right was based upon the irrigation of 160 acres of government
land, occupied by a predecessor of the defendant. That predecessor did
have a water right to irrigate those 160 acres: at least 160 and perhaps 172
miners' inches. The defendant's predecessor ultimately patented only 80 of
those acres, and the defendant succeeded to those 80 acres and all of the
water right. But, without explanation, the supreme court held that the
defendant could only succeed to a water right sufficient to irrigate 80 acres,
i.e. 80 miners' inches. The balance of the water right went to no one; it
simply evaporated.
Another downward "adjustment" of a water right occurred in Peck v
Simon." The plaintiff brought the suit to adjudicate water rights to
Brown's Gulch in Silver Bow County. He had used 400 miners' inches for
mining purposes, commencing in 1874; yet in his suit he was decreed an
21. Id. at 529.
22. Gilcrest v. Bowen, 95 Mont. 44, 24 P.2d 141 (1933).
23. Peck %'. Simon, 101 Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164 (1935).
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1874 right to only 275 miners' inches. The plaintiff did change his use from
mining to irrigation in 1882, which resulted in his using less water. But
there was no finding of abandonment, and since his diversion was
downstream from the defendant, the defendant couldn't be prejudiced by
the plaintiff's change of use. The court simply announced: "[Tlhe trial
court correctly limited the plaintiff's appropriations to the amount of use
made of the water after its change of use to agricultural purposes.24
The cases discussed in the preceding three paragraphs bring out some
of the uncertainties and hazards which lurk for appropriators in litigation
and adjudication. Here the supreme court seems to be saying that after a
right has vested, the owner's property interest may be diminished by a
subsequent and possibly temporary reduction in need.
But in these three cases the court may have been treating a larger,
widespread problem, without the legislative tools to enable it to clearly
articulate legal foundations for the results. The court surely was aware that
claims to water rights are commonly inflated beyond the appropriator's
actual original needs. The evidence to support such claims is frequently
limited to oral testimony based upon memories which are subject to error
and influence. And the late-comer who needs water can scarcely obtain
evidence to refute those claims to the early use of excessive quantities of
water. But excessive early appropriations should not be carried forward
into the future, limiting other applications and uses. In the absence of
effective legislation enabling the court to find abandonment or to enforce
forfeiture for non-use, the court seems to have obtained the result that
could come from such legislation, albeit on an ad hoc, discretionary case by
case basis.
C. Inquiry Into Original Needs Casts Doubt Upon Existing Rights
Closely related to the foregoing three cases is Allen v. Petrick25 an
adjudication of Strawberry Creek, which is a tributary of the Yellowstone
River in Park County. Philosophically it is allied to those three cases, but in
the Allen case, rather than admitting that the early appropriators had once
acquired a larger water right that was later confirmed to them, the supreme
24. Id. at 21. Galigerv. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339,260 P. 401 (1947) places a different limitation
on a water right. In that case the defendants apparently had a prior right to 450 miners' inches of water
from Ramshorn Creek in Madison County, result; from their use of it for mining. There was evidence,
however, that 300 of those inches had only been used from May 15 to July 15 of each year. In this
section the defendants sought to exercise the latter right, beyond July 15, but this was denied them. The
supreme court decreed defendants priority to 300 inches only to July 15 of each year. It is worth noting
that Galiger introduces a time dimension into a water right, i.e., regardless of priorities, a person may
be limited in how permanent or steady a flow he may enjoy. See also, Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550,
55 P.2d 697 (1936) and Quigley v. McIntosh, 110 Mont. 495, 103 P.2d 1067 (1940).
25. Allen v. Patrick, 69 Mont. 373, 222 P. 451 (1924).
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court inquired into the actual economic needs of the appropriators back
when their rights were acquired. The court reviewed and considered the
testimony taken by the trial court, and commented:
[Tlhe trial judges have been confronted with aged witnesses who
testified to what took place in early days. These venerable men,
having more or less knowledge of what they testified about,
frequently looked through mental magnifying glasses in at-
tempting to recall forgotten things from bygone days. 6
The supreme court reduced all of the claims of the parties, and, except for
one party, the court substantially reduced the amounts awarded by the trial
court decree. The whole tenor of the opinion was one of emphasizing the
need for economy in water use.
Such scrutiny and parsimony on the part of the supreme court may be
anticipated in any original adjudication of claims to water, and such an
approach, in adjudicating water rights in Montana, appears to be both
justified and needed. But, then, what can an appropriator whose right is not
yet adjudicated count upon? What will the court say his water right
amounts to?
D. Purchasers Don't Know the Quality They Are Buying
If a water right were similar to other property rights, it would be
readily transferable, at least so far as persons unaffected by the change of
location of diversion and use are concerned. Especially would this be true if
it were a decreed right. But the case of Brennan v. Jones27 qualifies and
limits the transferability of decreed rights. In that case an irrigation
company exchanged Bitterroot River water for Skalkaho Creek water; it
purchased early priority Skalkaho rights and delivered to the Skalkaho
vendors Bitterroot River water to replace what had been sold from the
Skalkaho. Then the company moved upstream on the Skalkaho so as to
gain elevation for canaling its purchased Skalkaho water out of the
watershed for distant users.
The plaintiffs (with one irrelevant exception) were water users still
farther upstream than the irrigation company's diversions, and so were not
affected by the changes in point of diversion or place of use, and their rights
were inferior in priority to the company's purchased rights. So the water
commissioner, with the approval of the district judge, restricted the
plaintiffs' diversions in order to deliver to the company a flow equal in
miners' inches to what it had purchased from downstream, high-priority
water users.
26. Id. at 378.
27. Brennan v. Jones, supra note 24.
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All of the rights had been decreed in 1916, and the company was not
diverting more water than had been decreed to its vendors. But it was using
that almost continuously. Would those vendors have needed such a
continuous flow for the purposes of their appropriations? The supreme
court doubted it. So it remanded the case to the district court to ascertain
how much the vendors would have actually needed from time to time for
their original purposes. Whatever that amount turned out to be, that was
the extent of the rights purchased.
The Brennan v. Jones case is unsettling of course, because it shrouds
the purchase of a water right in uncertainty for the purchaser -
uncertainty in the amount of his purchase, even though it is a decreed right,
and presumably superior in priority to all challengers. But still, the
plaintiffs in any case comparable to Brennan v. Jones should not find
themselves in a worse position just because someone else sold his water
right. As the court said:
One who purchases a water right independent of the land to
which it was theretofore appurtenant does not thereby enlarge or
extend the right, and one who so purchases such a right is entitled
to do only those things which the original owner of the water right
might have done.28
E. Adjudications are Inconclusive
The inconclusiveness of adjudications and decrees has been thor-
oughly discussed and documented in other writings,29 and so will not be
extensively treated here. Conclusiveness and certainty are attributes to be
desired for property rights. But one of the supreme court's attempts to
apply these attributes in litigation subsequent to an adjudication of a
28. Id. at 567.
29. Stone, Are There Any Adjudicated Streams in Montana?, 19 MONT. L. REV. 19 (1957);
Stone, The Long Count on Dempsey: No Final Decision in Water Right Adjudication, 31 MONT. L.
REV. I (1969). Gold Creek in Powell County (originally in Deer Lodge County) was adjudicated in
Caruthers v. Pemberton, I Mont. 111 (1869), again in 1915, Cause number 517, Powell County, and
was involved in litigation in Mannix & Wilson v. Thrasher, 95 Mont. 267, 26 P.2d 373 (1933) and
Thrasher v. Mannix & Wilson, 95 Mont. 273, 26 P.2d 370 (1933). Orphir Creek in Powell County was
adjudicated in 1928, Cause No. 1185, and returned to the supreme court in Quigley v. McIntosh, 88
Mont. 103, 290 P. 266 (1930) and McIntosh v. Graveley, - Mont. - , 495 P.2d 186 (1972).
Three Mile Creek in Powell County was adjudicated in 1913 and returned to the supreme court in
Quigley v. McIntosh, supra note 24. Prickly'Pear Creek in Lewis & Clark County was adjudicated in
Thorp v. Woolman, I Mont. 168 (1870), and returned in Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152,
201 P. 702 (1921). Crow Creek in Broadwater County was adjudicated in Smith v. Duff, 39 Mont. 382,
102 P. 984 (1909) and 39 Mont. 374, 102 P. (1909) and was again involved in Sherlock v. Graves, 106
Mont. 206, 76 P.2d 87 (1938). Bear Creek in Gallatin County was adjudicated in 1889, which decree
was changed in the readjudicated Conrow v. Huffine, 48 Mont. 437, 138 P. 1094 (1914). Note also the
multiple litigation discussed in subsection (F) of this paper.
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stream, illustrates how unjust may be the result. The case is Kramer v. Deer
Lodge Farms Co.,30 cited earlier in this paper because in that case the court
said that a decree is binding and conclusive upon all parties, and with
respect to all issues which would have been raised.3 1
In the Kramer case, one Johnson had been a party to an 1892
adjudication of Dempsey Creek, and was decreed a water right. But he did
not put in issue and ask for a decree concerning the use, since 1872, of water
from a nearby slough. Perhaps the omission is explainable, because no one
challenged his use, or perhaps because Johnson thought that the slough was
not tributary to Dempsey Creek. Kramer became Johnson's successor, and
in Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms Co. the trial court decreed Kramer a water
right in the slough, and found that the slough was not tributary to Dempsey
Creek. The supreme court found that the slough was tributary to Dempsey
Creek, and that Johnson lost this water right by failing to put it in issue in
1892.
So Kramer was denied a right to water which had been used for twenty
year's prior to the 1892 adjudication and for forty-three years after that
first case: a total of sixty-three years of continuous dependency upon the
claimed right - a result as grotesque for Kramer as the continuing strife
and litigation are for other water users. It occurred because we have no
consistent system of adjudication, and so Johnson (Kramer's predecessor)
had no forewarning that the 1892 adjudication would be given such
breadth.
The Kramer case is an aberration, an example of treating all
adjudication as broad, firm and conclusive, and an exception to the usual
narrowness and inconclusiveness of a decree. The usual pattern is illus-
trated by the case of Conrow v. Huffine 2 There, one Moore diverted the
entire flow of Bear Creek in Gallatin County in 1868 to irrigate seventy
acres. During the irrigation season the creek sometimes declined to only
100 miners' inches. In litigation against one Axtell in 1889, Moore had his
right confirmed by a decree awarding him the entire flow of the creek; that
became his adjudicated right, and the defendants were Moore's successors.
The plaintiff Conrow came along later, commenced irrigating, and
brought this suit seeking to reduce the old Moore right so as to obtain a
right with value for himself. The supreme court directed the trial court to
limit the claims under the Moore right to seventy inches for his seventy
acres, because Moore should not have needed more than that, and the
plaintiff should not be limited by a prior decree favoring Moore over Axtell,
because the plaintiff was not a party to that action.
30. Kramer v. Deer Lodge Farms Co., supra note 13.
31. Id. at 156.
32. Conrow v. Huffine, supra note 29.
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Conrow v. Huffine seems soundly decided, even though it is unsettling
to realize that a decreed water right may be successfully attacked by any
one affected by the use of the water who was not a party to the prior
adjudication. 33
F. Separate Adjudications Cannot Be Conjunctively Administered
The more decrees on water rights that a district judge has to
administer, the more impossible becomes his task. That would not have
been so true had the supreme court followed and extended Whitcomb v.
Murphy.34 In that case, rights to water from the Sun River and its
tributaries had been decreed in both Cascade and Lewis & Clark counties.
The supreme court held that the Lewis & Clark water commissioner must
recognize the plaintiff's right which had been decreed only by the Cascade
County court.
But in later years, the principle of Whitcomb was eroded and finally
washed away. In State ex rel. Swanson v. District Court,35 persons in
Lewis & Clark County applied to have the Lewis & Clark court appoint
water commissioner to distribute the water of Willow Creek in Lewis &
Clark County pursuant to the 1911 Cascade County adjudication of the
Sun River and its tributaries. It was held that the Lewis & Clark court had
no jurisdiction to administer the Cascade County decree as though the
water rights could be treated as unrelated to each other and independently
administered.
And in State ex rel. McKnight v. District Court,3" there were three
decrees, all from the Beaverhead district court, adjudicating the waters of
Red Rock River and Beaverhead River. The relatrix had a water right
decreed in proceeding number 576, and a canal company had decreed
rights under proceedings numbered 828 and 1053. The trial court ordered
its water commissioner to recognize all of the decreed rights, integrating
them so as to distribute the water according to the apparent prima facie
priorities and amounts, as in Whitcomb v. Murphy. But the supreme court
ruled that since these parties had not formally had their rights adjudicated
in relation to each other, the trial court could not grant priority of
inferiority to these parties in relation to one another. Apparently they were
expected to bring still another adjudication of these same waters, in which
all rights and parties could have their days in court together.
Where do these last two cases leave the district courts and the parties?
33. See also, State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court; 100 Mont. 376,47 P.2d 653 (1935) and State
ex rel. Pew v. District Court, 34 Mont. 233, 85 P. 525 (1906).
34. Whitcomb v. Murphy, supra note 12.
35. State ex rel Swanson v. District Court, 107 Mont. 203, 82 P.2d 779 (1938).
36. State ex rel McKnight v. District Court, I11 Mont. 520, 111 P.2d 292 (1941).
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Except when all claimants have been parties to the same adjudication, the
several uses of water and the several water rights of the claimants, although
very much related to one another factually, now have no relationship to one
another legally.
G. Greater Efficiency in Water Use May Have the Effect of
Reducing the Right
Can one who could manage to use less water by reason of changing to
sprinkler irrigation from ditch irrigation (or some other form of increased
efficiency) extend his use to additional acreage and still stay within his
water right? Maybe so, but there are some good reasons to doubt that he
can thus extend his use.
In discussing the Moore right in Conrow v. Huffine, Justice Brantly
said:
The use must be beneficial, and, when the appropriator or his
successor ceases to use the water for such purpose, the right
ceases. (Rev. Codes, sec. 4841 [now sec. 89-802].) If conditions
change as time passes, and the necessity for the use diminishes, to
the extent of the lessened necessity the change inures to the
benefit of subsequent appropriators having need of the use, for,
subject to the rule that "as between appropriators the one first in
time is first in right" (sec. 4845 [now sec. 89-807].), the prior
appropriator may not divert from the stream more than an
amount actually necessary for his use (sec. 4844 [now sec. 89-
805].). While, therefore, the extent of the right cannot in any
case exceed the capacity of the means of diversion, the ultimate
question in every case is: How much will supply the actual needs
of the prior claimant under existing conditions ?-37
This question was more directly involved in Quigley v. McIntosh,3"
wherein the two appellants, Quigley and Kimmerly had increased their
irrigated acreage although they were not taking a greater volume of flow
(in miners' inches) than had been decreed to them. All of the parties to this
suit had been parties to the 1913 decree, all had decreed rights thereunder,
and these appellants had been decreed priority for their rights. Moreover,
they were only using the water within the land described in the 1913 decree.
But the supreme court ruled that they were limited to the amount of water
needed to irrigate only the acreage under irrigation in 1913. The court said:
It seems indisputable that a water user who has been decreed the right to
use a certain number of inches of water upon lands for which a beneficial
37. Conrow v. Huffine, supra note 29 at 444-445.
38. Quigley v. McIntosh, supra note 24.
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use has been proven, cannot subsequently extend the use of that water to
additional lands not under actual or contemplated irrigation at the time the
right was decreed, to the injury of subsequent appropriators .... for by what
constitutes an additional or third use or appropriation by the first user, an
intervening appropriation by a second user, although earlier in time, might
be entirely destroyed. Of course, water must be appropriated and decreed
under our system for some useful and beneficial purpose. [citation] The
proof of the existence of such purpose and the use applied to the same, as
shown in the original case, of necessity formed the basis for the awards
finally given in the 1913 decree.3 9
Further authority on this point comes from Brennan v. Jones,40 the
case in which an irrigation company purchased high-priority downstream
rights on Skalkaho Creek and then diverted water out of the watershed,
continuously, in an amount equal to the miners' inches decreed to its
vendors. The critical issue in the case was the point being discussed in this
subsection, and the holding was that since a water right cannot be enlarged
by sale and purchase, the purchaser can divert only so much water as his
vendor would have needed for the purposes of his appropriation - very
likely not a continuous flow of his decreed volume.
H. Recapitulation of the Difficulties
The holdings of the Montana supreme court point up various
difficulties in Montana's water law; they may be reviewed in capiule form.
If a water right were as simple and certain, and if adjudications were as
conclusive as have sometimes been supposed, then the following statements
would surely be true. But none of them can be relied upon, and there is
authority that each one of them is false.
1. Since the 1885 statute says"[Alny person hereafter desiring to appro-
priate.., must post a notice... [and] shall file with the county clerk.., a
notice of appropriation..." one must now make a written record of any new
appropriation.4
2. The county clerk's records of appropriations are a good and useful
source of information for ascertaining who has water rights (since 1885)
and the extent of those rights.42
3. If the first appropriator on a stream applies a known rate of flow to a
39. Id. at 505.
40. Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164, and see, discussion supra note 23.
41. The statute is R.C.M. 1947, § 89-8 10, but it need not be complied with. Murray v. Tingley,
20 Mont. 260,269,50 P. 723 (1897); Musselshell Valley Farming & Livestock Co. v. Cooley, 86 Mont.
276, 290-291, 283 P. 213 (1929); Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154, 171-172, 122 P. 575 (1912);
Clausen v. Armington, 123 Mont. 1, 14, 212 P.2d 440 (1949).
42. Id., and see, discussion supra note 19.
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beneficial use, that rate is his permanent right, and he will be decreed
priority to that flow, limited only by his current needs.4 3
4. In an original adjudication the appropriators will be decreed the
amounts that they diverted and put to a beneficial use."
5. If one sells a water right, say, for example, one for 500 miners' inches, the
purchaser acquires a right to take 500 inches, at least so far as persons
unaffected by the change of location of diversion and use are concerned.45
6. Once all of the water users on a creek have been joined and their rights
adjudicated, the decree is conclusive and the disputes are over, because
they have had their "rights settled in one action" per R.C.M. 1947, § 89-
8 15.46
7. When different parties have had their rights decreed in different
adjudications a water commissioner can be appointed by the district judge
to allocate the water in accordance with the priorities set forth in the
decrees.47
8. A user who has already been decreed a quantity of water will be
protected in his decreed right against a latecomer who has no decreed
right.48
9. A user who is able to accomplish the purpose of his appropriation with
less than his decreed right, as e.g., through greater efficiency of use, can
apply his surplus property (his water) to some other beneficial use."
It is not here contended that water rights should be so simple and
mechanically administered that all of the foregoing statements should be
true. But these statements do represent pretty much what the public and
even water users believe about water rights, and what the public and the
users desire. To come closer to that belief and this desire, clarifying
legislation is needed to supply guidelines which courts or administrators
could then follow, and which would remove many of the uncertainties
created over the past century by our case-by-case, judicially formed water
law. Some suggestions with respect to such legislation will follow.
I1. "ADMINISTRATION, CONTROL, AND REGULATION"
Montana's new constitution commands:
The legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and
43. See, discussion supra notes 20 to 24.
44. See, discussion supra notes 25 and 26.
45. See, discussion supra notes 27 and 28.
46. See, discussion supra notes 29 to 33.
47. See, discussion supra notes 34 to 36.
48. See, discussion supra notes 32 and 33.
49. See, discussion supra notes 37 to 40.
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regulation of water rights .... 1
Quite properly, the constitution is silent with respect to just what the
legislature must do and how it should be implemented. What are the
principal needs which the legislature should examine?
A. There Must Be a Conclusive Ascertainment of Existing Rights
Providing for a conclusive ascertainment of existing rights is the
foundation for building a more rational and orderly structure of water law.
Montana has three codified methods of adjudicating water rights. One of
them provides for the State Engineer (now the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation) to bring actions to adjudicate streams, 51 but
these code sections have never been implemented. The non-use of this
method may be attributable to the fact that the code does not provide for
publication of summons so as to join, and bind, all persons, whether or not
they receive actual notice of the proceedings and put forth their claims for
adjudication. Consequently, any proceeding under these code sections
would not be conclusive, and any decree emanating therefrom would be
subject to attack by any person who was not a party.
A second adjudication provision authorizes the State Water Conser-
vation Board (now also the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation) to adjudicate its sources of supply for state projects,52 and
hence is more narrow than the statutes described in the foregoing
paragraph. It also has not been of use, and suffers from exactly the same
deficiencies as those statutes first discussed - again, a lapse in legislative
draftsmanship.
The third provision for adjudicating water rights has been used
frequently; in fact, it has been used over and over again for adjudicating
and re-adjudicating the same water rights." That is because it is the basic
provision in Montana law expressly authorizing private litigation over
water rights, and hence it is invoked whenever a dispute arises over water
rights. But it also suffers from the same deficiencies as the previously
discussed methods - there is no provision for publication of notice which
binds all persons who might claim an interest in a stream whether or not
they receive actual notice and put forth their claims for adjudication. Nor
has it prevented multiple litigation between the same parties. 4
In other western states there are three predominant methods for
settling water rights: the Wyoming system, the Oregon system, and the
50. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(4) (1972).
51. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 89-847 to 89-855.
52. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-118.
53. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-815.
54. See, supra note 29.
1991]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
system derived from the Bien Code.
The Wyoming system55 authorizes the Board of Control to select
streams for adjudication, to publish notice of the investigation and hearing,
and (after a hearing by the Division Superintendent) to make the
determination of rights which is conclusive and binding upon all. An
aggrieved person may appeal to the courts.
The Oregon systemse starts out similarly to the Wyoming system, in
that the State Engineer publishes and mails notice, conducts an investiga-
tion and hearing, and makes a determination of all rights. But then this
administrative order of determination is filed in a circuit court, where
interested parties may file exceptions, and from which emanates a final
court decree of adjudication which is conclusive and binding upon all,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
The Bien Code system5" derives its name from Morris Bien of the U.S.
Reclamation Service who drafted this system of stream adjudication in
1903. It provides for an administrator such as the State Engineer to
prepare a hydrographic survey and transmit it to the state Attorney
General, who then brings an action in court based upon the Engineer's
findings and determinations. Some of the states which use the Bien Code
provide for publication of notice and a conclusive decree.58
The following is a summary chart of the systems in effect in the
Western states:59
55. WVo. STATS. A\N, (1947) §§ 41-165 to 41-193.
56. OREG. REV. STATS. (1971) §§ 439.202 to 439.200.
57. N. MEX. STATS. ANN. (1953) §§ 74-4-2 to 75-4-6.
58. N. MEX. STATS. ANN. (1953) §§ 75-4-2 to 74-4-6; UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) § 73-4-22; REv.
CODE WASH. AN'\. § 90.03.220. See, table which follows and notes cited thereunder.
59. ALASKA STATS. AN,. (1962) §§ 46.15-010 to 46.15.135; ARIz. REV. STATS. (1956) §§ 45-
231 to 45-243; WEST'S ANN. WATER CODE, §§ 2501 to 2527, 2750, 2767, 2774; COLO. REV. STATS.
(1963) 1971 PERM. Cu.. SUPP., §§ 664-31 to 664-36; IDA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-1406 to 42-1411; KAN.
STATS. A-,\. §§ 82a-704 and 82a-724; R.C.M. 1947, §§ B9-847 to 89-855, 89-118, 89-815; NIBR.
R.R.C. (1943), §§ 46-229.03 to 46-230; NEV. REV. STATS. §§ 533.090 to 533.205; N. MEX. STATS.
A'N. (1953) §§ 75-4-2 to 75-4-6; N. DAK. CE\T. CODE, §§ 61-03-15 to 61-03-19; OKLA. STATS. ANN.
§§ 82-6 to 82-14; OREG. REX. STATS. (1971) §§ 539.020 to 539.200; S.DAK. COMIP. LAWS (1967) §§
46-10-I to 46-10-8; VERNo\'S TEX NS CODE ANN,., WATER CODE, §§ 5.303 to 5.322; UTAH CODE ANN.
(1953) § 73-4-I to 73-4-22; REV. CODE WASH. ANN. §§ 90.02.110 to 90.03.220; WYO. STATS. ANN.
(1957) §§ 41-165 to 41-193.
[Vol. 12
1991] MONTANA WATER RIGHTS 21
Stat Type of Who tnvts =gt & Whos Coe t Povido onlusive? How Court
Syote Neeen? WeBd iI Publioetio? I o
S: Engaged
Alaska Wyo. ComejaNt. Re. Com4NaL Ye Eopliedly Appeal
Ren
Ann. O9eg. SL Lood Dept. Court Y Yes iled in Cout
Cali. Oreg. Water R. Bd. Cow Yes Y. Filed in Cour
Colo. Referee under a Water Court Prior edjud tako Yes Ye. Coor
Judge priority proceeding
Hawii Court Cou Private party or state yon Ye. ecept Cour
-zy bing sit. Peroon out of pto-eedmg
Id.. Oreg. St. Reo. lEg. Coon Ye yen Filed in Court
Kent. Oreg. Cdef. Eig'r. Court Deterination does not Yen Yen if Appeal by
sottle eightt intee-noe appeatled to anyone
but an appeal weould Coon aggrieved
have that teot'
Moot., I. DeptiNt. R. Con Private SuiL No No Court
2. Cot Court No No roceedig
Nebr. Wyo. Dier~aer Ron Dept.1 yen Yen Appeal
NaL Res,
Nevada Oreg. St. Erg'r. Court St. Eng debts. Ye Ye Filed in Cor
Hyde. sorvey to Atty. Coort
N. M... Bien St. Eng'r. court Gen. who tees. Cout Yes Ye proceeding
ay too refereen.
N. Dat. ien St. Eng'. Cour Sarte as N. Mee. No ' Coo
Says all claiant shell ptoeedioc
be joined.
IKans. Stats. Ann. § 82a-704 provides for the chief engineer to make an investigation and an order
determining all rights prior to 1945 (post-1945 rights are by permit) but further provides that his determination is
not an adjudication of the relative rights between vested right holders, and hence may be an inconclusive, limited
proceeding. But the proceeding apparently will determine the state's administration of water rights, and an
aggrieved person may appear under K.S.A. § 82a-724. It would seem that the decree on appeal would be a
conclusive adjudication.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 89.118, briefly discussed, supra note 52, is omit-ted, as it does not appear to be a general
adjudication statute, but merely one enabling the Dept. of Nat. Res. & Cons. to adjudicate its sources of supply
for state projects, and the rights on streams where there are such projects.
'Whether North Dakota has provided for a conclusive adjudication seems in doubt. The legislative intent
seems to be present, for " ... all who claim the right to use such waters shall be made parties .... ' N.Dak.
Cent. Code § 61-03-17, and all who claim a right shall be joined in the suit by the attorney general, § 61-03-15.
But there is no provision for service by publication, and hence there remains the possibility of unjoined
claimants.
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'Okla . Stats. Ann. § 82-13 provides for permissive joinder of parties, and that those not joined are not
hound.
'Okla. Stats. Ann. § 82-6 deserves the same comment aa that made with respect to Kansas, supra note 60.
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The foregoing table reveals that among the nineteen western states,
Montana is in a minority of three that offer no conclusive water adjudica-
tion system. That is why there is so little security or certainty in a Montana
water right, and why people have to return to court time and time again to
defend what has already been decreed to them.61 Surely this should be a
primary concern of the legislature under Art. IX, § 3 of the new Montana
constitution.
B. Future Water Rights Must Be Acquired By Permit
In addition to providing for a final determination and adjudication of
existing and past vested rights, newly acquired rights should be equally
definite, certain, and public in record: Montana's present loose law, by
which a water right may be acquired simply by making use of water,61
inherently results in uncertainty, ignorance of what rights there are in a
stream, disputes, and litigation. And the statutory method of appropria-
tion, under which a person files with the county clerk a statement of what he
hopes to put to a beneficial use,62 has exactly the same deficiencies.
The third paragraph of Art. IX, § 3 of the new constitution provides:
All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within
the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use
of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided by law. The law should provide for considering all
public interests each time a prospective water user seeks to have a
part of this property of the state committed to his use. And so the
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, or an
agency under that Department should review the benefit to the
public, as well as the effect on other water users, of granting an
additional franchise to use this public property. That is one
reason why a person should be required to secure a permit, in
effect a license, to make a new use of Montana's water.
There is another reason for requiring persons to obtain a permit from a
state agency which is concerned with water uses: to introduce some control
over how much water a person may claim for a particular use.63
And lastly, when a person appropriates under a permit system, both he
and anyone else who is interested will be able to ascertain what has been
done, what the new appropriator is entitled to do, when he can do it, and
what his relationship is to other users.
60. See, discussion supra notes 29 to 32.
61. See, discussion supra note 41 and 15 to 17.
62. Id.
63. Dissatisfaction with existing inadequacies is eloquently expressed in Allen v. Patrick, supra
note 25.
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C. Administering the Resource Should Be Recognized As An
Administrative, Not a Judicial Task
Of course, the use of water in many of the streams of the state is
controlled and regulated by the users themselves, without an undue
amount of disagreement and conflict. Those users have no present need or
desire for an outside administrator, and may never have such a need. They
should be left undisturbed. But other water users on other streams cannot
do without a water commissioner to open and close headgates and
generally oversee the uses of the water.
Montana law provides that after there has been an adjudication, and
after application by the owners of at least fifteen percent of the decreed
water rights, the district judge may appoint one or more water commission-
ers to distribute water to the parties according to their decreed rights,64 for
so long a period during the irrigation season as the judge finds necessary.6 5
A water user who is dissatisfied with the water commissioner's administra-
tion can file a complaint in the district court, whereupon the other affected
water users are notified and the matter is set for a hearing - i.e., a trial
which culminates in an order by the judge either confirming the commis-
sioner's administration or instructing him on the proper distribution of the
water.66 Any party aggrieved by the district judge's order may appeal to
the Montana supreme court.67
The foregoing system of administration of water rights has serious
disadvantages for everyone involved with it. In the first place, there has to
be a water rights lawsuit before there can be any administration,68 and such
suits are both costly and time consuming. Then, if there is dissatisfaction or
disagreement, the only recourse that a person has is to file a complaint in
the district court and engage in another expensive and time consuming
lawsuit.6 9 The district judge, already burdened with more typically legal
matters, must maintain familiarity with all of the factual details concern-
ing the use and distribution of water within his district, in order to be
competent to appoint commissioners and supervise their various activities.
In effect, the district judge is compelled to act as the district supervisor of
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1001. This statute also authorizes the appointment or one or more water
commissioners by petition of less than 15 % of such owners if they can show that they are unable to
obtain the water to which they are entitled.
65. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1004.
66. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1015.
67. Quigley v. McIntosh, supra note 24; Whitcomb v. Murphy, supra note 12; State ex rel.
McKnight v. District Court, supra note 36; Allen v. Wampler 143 Mont. 486, 392 P.2d 82 (1964).
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1001. And see, the equitable proceedings for injunction: Parsons v.
Mussigbrod, 59 Mont. 336, 196 P. 528 (1921); Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 81 P.2d 353 (1938).
69. Which lawsuit, under R.C.M. 1947, § 89-1015, can only affect parties to the prior
adjudication. State ex rel. Reeder v. District Court, supra note 33.
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water uses, a job for which he has no special training or expertise.7 0
District judges and their water commissioners have no authority to
administer or control uses of water by persons who were not parties to an
adjudication.7 1 That too should be changed.
District supervisors are needed to direct the water commissioners, and
they should be trained in engineering, hydrology, and administration. They
should be responsible to the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation or an agency under that Department. And they should have
authority for "the administration, control, and regulation" 72 of all water
uses, not just those of parties to a law suit.
Then, when disagreements or disputes arise, an expeditious, relatively
informal, and inexpensive administrative hearing before the district
supervisor can be held to settle differences. Although a person may obtain
judicial review of an order by a district supervisor, it is likely that most
proceedings will end at this administrative level. Water users would thus
have a faster and less costly adjustment and settlement of conflicts by a
person qualified and specialized in water resource matters. People simply
should not have to engage in a law suit every tinie a conflict arises over the
distribution of water.
IV. CONCLUSION
(1) There must be a conclusive ascertainment of existing rights; (2)
future water rights - must be acquired by permit; and (3) administering
the resource should be recognized as an administrative, not a judicial task.
These three areas broadly sketched in the preceding section are the ones to
be focused upon and developed if legislation is to create order and clarity in
our water laws in place of the ad hoc improvisation on a case-by-case basis
which is the situation today. The new constitution has put responsibility for
action upon the legislature.
70. See, the protest against this burden by one district judge, quoted in Stone, Problems Arising
Out of Montana's Law of Water Rights, 27 MONT. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1965).
71. State ex rel Reeder v. District Court, supra note 33.
72. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(4) (1972).
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